Introduction
Film and television portrayals of posthuman cyborgs melding biology and technology, simultaneously "animal and machine" (Haraway 1991, p.149 
Historical Background
There is rich and varied cinematic history exploring the bounds of technologically-enhanced embodiment. Perhaps the first on-screen cyborg can be found in The Colossus of New York (1958) , where the brain of an acclaimed scientist-severely injured in a car accident after winning a Nobel Peace Prize-is transplanted into a robotic body by his neurosurgeon father. Predictably, this project does not end well. But more cyborgs soon made on-screen appearances. Dr. No, the evil mastermind in the first James Bond movie-the 1962 film starring Sean Connery bears his name-is a cyborg sporting robotic arms, implanted after Chinese mobsters cut off his hands, that give him superhuman strength. Cyborg Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 . 2 2087 (1966 emerged a few years later. It tells the story of a cyborg sent back in time from the year 2087 to 1966 by a group of "free thinkers". His mission: prevent the development of technology that will eventually enable mass mind control. More recently, The Machine (2013), a slick, low-budget indie sci-fi thriller, explores different varieties of cybernetic augmentation: from severely wounded soldiers being resuscitated as powerful fighting machines via neural implants and specialized prosthetic limbs, to the remnants of a murdered artificial intelligence researcher's neural information being transferred into a self-aware, morally conflicted robot killer bearing her physical likeness.
Forthcoming in Handbook of Posthumanism in
Despite an understandable tendency to associate cinematic cyborgs with menacing characters like the Terminator or Darth Vader-these are the characters that seem to endure in our imagination, due both to the extent of their technologically-enhanced transformations (who can forget Vader's ominous cybernetic armor and mechanical breathing?) as well as the high-definition havoc they wreakthere are nevertheless friendlier examples of film and television cyborgs, too. For example, the television show The Six Million Dollar Man (1974 Man ( -1978 chronicles the adventures of Steve Austen, an
American astronaut who suffers a devastating accident while testing an experimental aircraft. He barely survives; his right arm, legs, and left eye are replaced with advanced "bionic" implants that give him superhuman strength, speed, and vision. The newly-constructed "bionic man" eventually goes to work as an agent for a top-secret US government office, heroically battling evils all and sundry. Cyborgs have also caught the imagination of young viewers. Although the film is largely forgettable, Inspector Gadget (1999)-based upon the popular television cartoon series of the same name-is essentially a Robocop for children. It tells the tale of John Brown, an earnest but bumbling security guard who, after being severely injured while attempting to thwart a robbery, wakes up to find that his damaged body has been retrofitted with a host of different on-demand technologies and gadgets enabling him to become a more effective (if still somewhat bumbling) crime fighter. Posthumanism in Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 3 Two things stand out from this brief survey. First, most on-screen portrayals of technologicallyaugmented embodiment stem from dramatic medical interventions, primarily the need to physically recover from some kind of catastrophic accident resulting in the loss of limbs, other body parts, or one's entire non-neural body (e.g., The Colossus of New York). Even Darth Vader's ominous black armor has a critical biomedical function. It consists of both prosthetic limbs as well as a portable life-support system enabling Vader to function after sustaining near-fatal injuries while battling Obi-Wan Kenobi. Rarely are non-medical cases portrayed; presumably non-critical cases of cybernetic enhancement lack the requisite dramatic impact. Second, most representations of cyborgs in films are characterized by the extent to which the subject's cybernetic augmentation renders them profoundly other. (Hayles 2002, p.6) . Of course, these are fictional characters designed to maximize visual and narrative impact. Nevertheless, focusing just on these extreme cases does potentially obscure a more nuanced understanding of the way that cyborg realities can facilitate a deeper connection not just with the subject's lived embodiment but also with the social world in which they are embedded.
Forthcoming in Handbook of
In what follows, I want to take a more phenomenologically oriented and "situated" approach to embodiment in film and television. Part of the force of the posthuman vision comes from the recognition that technological augmentations of mind, body, and self are not simply exotic possibilities Forthcoming in Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 4 in the distant future. Rather, these augmentations are already a central part of our everyday lives; they are perpetually in-progress, happening all the time and in ways both small and significant. We are, after all, "natural born cyborgs" (Clark 2003) . So instead of focusing on extreme examples exemplified by the Cyborg Holy Trinity of the Terminator, Robocop, and Darth Vader, I want to instead look at more mundane representations of biotech augmentation that arise from a subject's desire to connect more deeply with self and other, that is, a desire to become more deeply enmeshed within the mundane dynamics of our social embodiment. In order to set up this perspective, however, I first consider discussions of "plastic" embodiment and cognitive extension in recent philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
From plastic embodiment to cognitive extension
The plastic body "Embodiment" is a central theme in current philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This is especially apparent in a family of views that fall under the label "embodied approaches to cognition" (e.g., Gallagher 2005; Gibbs 2005 , Shapiro 2014 ). Embodied approaches to cognition argue that distinctively human forms of thought, perception, and affect are profoundly shaped by both the sorts of bodies we have (their physiology, morphology, etc.) as well as the things they can do (their capacity for movement, action, ability to use and incorporate various tools, etc.). Although embodied cognition theorists endorse a variety of ontological commitments and methodologies, proponents are nevertheless united in their rejection of the mind as something localized wholly in the head. They argue that mind is something that emerges within, and is even at times constituted by, ongoing patterns of world-engaged, world-involving action. (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008) . These lines of evidence seem to support to the idea that the body-beyond-the-brain makes a nontrivial contribution to both the form and content of our mental life.
But our bodies are not fixed entities. Rather, embodiment is, in a concrete sense, malleable, open-plastic (Krueger and Legrand 2009) . Bodies are open to various forms of augmentation which in turn generate both structural and functional reconfiguration. One of the ways to bring out this plastic character of embodiment is to look at the various ways that we routinely incorporate and merge with the tools and technologies populating our everyday environments. These body-world couplings are instructive. They indicate how biotech augmentations not only change the physical structure and functional capacities of our bodies. They also reconfigure the phenomenology of our embodiment, that is, the way we experience our bodies as well as the way the world is disclosed to us via this bodily experience.
Consider the way that simply picking up a stick and using it to probe our environment alters our felt sense of embodiment. After a few moments of habituation, the stick is no longer felt to be an object that we hold, something distinct from us and our agency. Rather, as Merleau-Ponty (1945 /1962 famously observed, the stick disappears, experientially speaking; it becomes the transparent vehicle Forthcoming in Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 6 through which we perceptually access the world. Within this process, we experience a reconfiguration of our local sense of embodiment. When we skillfully deploy the stick to explore our world, we experience our body, as well as its attendant sensorimotor capacities, as extending into and through the stick (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1999) . Moreover, we experience an expanded set of action-possibilities that flow from this newly-expanded sense of embodiment (Hirose 2002) . The environment is experienced as affording interactions that weren't there a moment ago: we can reach, poke, probe, and manipulate previously closed-off aspects of our world. TVSS is a prosthetic visual technology that relies on the body's ability to map information from one modality to another. It operates by transducing visual information from the environment, which enters through a head-mounted camera, into patterns of vibrations conveyed via stimulators in contact with the skin of the wearer's abdomen, back, thigh, or tongue. As blind subjects adjust to the experience of wearing TVSS and begin to move around their environment, they report having quasi-visual experiences of three-dimensional objects-a kind of technologically-augmented tactile vision. Moreover, the technology very quickly becomes transparent, experientially speaking. The wearer no longer experiences the technology as an object but rather as something that has been integrated into their body and which helps to disclose the world in a perceptually novel way.
TVSS may seem like the stuff of Terminator-style science fiction. But many similar everyday examples abound: we wear glasses to improve vision, hearing aids to enhance auditory perception, braces to stabilize unsteady joint and enhance balance, and electric wheelchairs to provide mobility.
Skilled athletes and musicians routinely merge with their baseball bats and bagpipes, golf clubs and Forthcoming in Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 7 guitars, and in so doing experience an expanded sense of embodiment and sensorimotor possibilities.
The point, then, is that at the level of our plastic embodiment, everyday technologies integrate with our body and in so doing affect both functional and phenomenological change. This is because we are profoundly embodied agents, "creatures for whom body, sensing, world, and technology are resources apt for recruitment in ways that yield a permeable and repeatedly reconfigurable agent/world boundary" (Clark 2007, p.279) .
The embodied mind, extended
Taking the nature of our plastic embodiment seriously opens the door to a more radical thesis, one very much in in line with posthuman discussions of technologically-augmented personhood (Malafouris 2008; Thweatt-Bates 2011) . This is the extended mind thesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010 ). The extended mind thesis claims that the physical machinery of mind is not confined to the head. Rather, mental states such as beliefs and memories can be partially realized by artefacts and technologies beyond the boundaries of skin and skull.
In Clark and Chalmer's (1998) classic thought experiment, Otto-who suffers from memory loss brought on by a mild form of Alzheimer's-carries a trusty notebook with him wherever he goes. Any time Otto picks up some new information, he records it in his notebook. When he needs that information (e.g., when he wants to remember the location of MoMA in New York so he can go see an exhibition), Otto simply consults this ever-present notebook, retrieves the information, and acts on it.
According to Clark and Chalmers, this is a case of extended cognition. Some of Otto's dispositional beliefs-such as his belief that MoMA is on 53 rd street-are housed in his notebook. This is because the information in the notebook is functionally poised to play the same role that brain-bound information plays in non-extended cases, i.e., cases where an individual appeals purely to their internal bio- We need not appeal to thought experiments or science fiction narratives to further motivate this idea. Consider real-world memory augmentation. Smartphones and portable calendars help us recall appointments and phone numbers; affixing a yellow sticky note to the side of a computer monitor or by the door prompts recall of to-do items; even social and cultural practices and institutions (political structures, religious rituals, legal systems, etc.) play a cognitive role by encoding the complex web of historical narratives, memories, beliefs, and procedural knowledge collectively learned over many generations (Gallagher 2013 ). When we engage with these external structures and processes, we bootstrap our biological capacities-and within this ongoing engagement "the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right" (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.8) .
In its original formulation, the extended mind thesis was thought to apply to non-conscious cognitive states (e.g., dispositional beliefs) but not necessarily to conscious mental states, such as emotions (Clark 2009; cf. Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003 Leonard remembers is intervening in his wife's assault. He vaguely recalls shooting and killing one of the people responsible for the crime before being hit on the head by another assailant, moments after watching his wife die. Understandably, Leonard is now driven by an obsessive desire to find his wife's killer and exact his revenge.
But we soon learn that things are not this straightforward. First, Leonard's motives may not be as noble as they initially appear. He willingly clings to a fabricated memory of a blissful marriage that, in reality, was deeply conflicted and probably violent. As his investigation unfolds, Leonard destroys all evidence compromising this fabricated reconstruction; he actively manipulates his memory in order to forget undesirable facts. Additionally, we soon come to see that Leonard's associates-a corrupt former cop and a barmaid with a checkered past-are exploiting Leonard for their own agendas. Leonard's rage-fuelled drive for revenge (including his eagerness to kill, if necessary) and his profoundly compromised memory render him supremely vulnerable to their ongoing manipulation. As he copes Forthcoming in Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. with his unreliable memory and struggles to cling to fleeting moments of clarity, the viewer realizes that
Leonard is caught up in a complex network of half-truths and lies-many of them of his own making.
The dizzying dramatic impact of Memento comes from its narrative style which brazenly flouts the conventions of linear storytelling. As the story unfolds, we are taken directly into Leonard's fractured experience: color sequences are interspersed with black and white sequences; the beginning and ending of events are spliced atop one another, confounding the meaning and context of different key occurrences and potentially opening up new lines of interpretation and significance. The effect of this fractured narrative is that the viewer gets a firsthand taste of the phenomenology of Leonard's experience of a perpetually unstable world; we empathize, experientially, with his inability to find a firm narrative foothold in order to make sense of what is happening before each present moment withdraws into the darkness of his amnesia.
So how does he cope? Even in his compromised state, Leonard still has access to many of the same cognitive resources that all natural born cyborgs do: his body and the surrounding environment.
Leonard exploits these resources in a desperate attempt to stabilize his memory and retain new information. He collects scraps of paper, receipts, notes, and diary pages. He annotates Polaroid photos of important places and objects. Crucially, Leonard systematically organizes this information and places these artefacts in particular locations as memory prompts; since Leonard wakes up each morning with no memory of the previous day, this ritual of setting up the environment to reliably trigger a cascade of memories becomes a critical exercise. Leonard has, in effect, transformed a difficult cognitive problem (i.e., remembering complex information) into a much simpler perceptual problem by skillfully engineering his cognitive environment.
But Leonard quite literally has another trick up his sleeve. The most important information Leonard acquires is tattooed onto his body. Over time, Leonard's skin is gradually transformed into a Forthcoming in Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
11 cognitive prosthesis, an external memory device that exhibits a stability and reliability Leonard's neurobiological memory lacks. Leonard's body thus remembers the things his brain cannot. Collectively, then, Leonard attempts to use these memory-augmenting technologies-again, including the surface of his own body, now deliberately reconfigured into a cognitive prosthetic-to slowly build up a stock of new beliefs about the mystery of his wife's death and in so doing establish a bedrock of long-term knowledge that will, he hopes, lead him to his wife's killer.
One of the many compelling embodiment-related themes in Memento is its exploration of what
Leonard both gains and loses by relying on his body and environment so deeply. For, although these embodied strategies and resources enhance Leonard's recall ability, they also render him extremely vulnerable. One of the consequences of Leonard's functional reconfiguration of his embodiment (i.e., turning his body primarily into a memory storage device) is that Leonard's experience of embodiment is profoundly altered. Leonard no longer simply inhabits his body as a subject; it ceases to be the transparent medium through which Leonard encounters the world. In virtue of his deep cognitive reliance on his body's ever-increasing number of tattoos, his body is transfigured primarily into an object, another technology used to store and access crucial case-specific information. This is reflected in the way that Leonard spends a great deal of time simply looking at his body, standing in front of a mirror while studying his tattoos and trying to piece together the clues they hold. Leonard's relation with his embodiment in this way becomes as fractured and vulnerable as is his relation with the environment. He no longer inhabits his body transparently. Rather, as essential parts of his externalized memory, both
Leonard's carefully curated collection of notes and photographs as well as the tattoos on his body occupy a contested public space vulnerable to manipulation and sabotage by others (Sterelny 2004) . His memories are no longer his alone; they inhabit a public domain and are therefore open to the deception and hidden agendas of other people. Indeed, we soon see that many of these externalized memories are sabotaged by others, including Leonard's manipulative associates as well as "other" Leonards from
Forthcoming in Handbook of Posthumanism in Film and Television, eds. Hauskeller, M., Philbeck, T., and Carbonell, C. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. previous days and weeks the present-day Leonard can no longer recall. Leonard's functionally augmented embodiment is thus a source of both intimacy and alienation, security and vulnerability. to-and-fro of interactions, extreme discomfort at being held or touched by others, narrowly circumscribed interests and ritualistic or compulsive behavior, and heightened sensitivity to sounds, textures, smells, light, etc. Temple describes her own childhood as a period where she displayed many of these symptoms: "no speech, poor eye contact, tantrums, appearance of deafness, no interest in people, and constant staring off into space" (Grandin 2006, p.33) . As a child, Temple was taken to a neurologist and declared "brain-damaged". Eventually, however, with the support of her mother and the patient mentorship of a high school science teacher, Temple discovered her immense intellectual gifts. But she still struggled to emotionally connect with others.
A crucial step in Temple's entry into the social world was her development of a kind of emotional technology she calls the "squeeze machine" (Grandin 2006, pp. 56-83) . Temple modeled her squeeze machine on farm technology: "crushes" used to immobilize livestock while being branded or given veterinary treatment. Livestock crushes consist of a small stall, just long enough for the animal to enter, an entrance gate which can be closed behind the animal, and a "head bail" at the front of the stall What Temple discovered is that her squeeze machine functions as an external technology replicating human touch-but without the unpredictable elements of face-to-face interaction she finds distressing. She tells us that, "From as far back as I can remember, I always hated to be hugged. I wanted to experience the good feeling of being hugged, but it was too overwhelming. It was like a great, allengulfing tidal wave of stimulation, and I reacted like a wild animal" (Grandin 2006, p.56) . When bodily integrated with the squeeze machine, however, Temple can comfortably regulate the sensory parameters of the encounter.
Emboldened by this discovery, Temple used her engineering genius to build many iterations of her squeeze machine-from a crude, hastily-assembled model comprised of plywood panels and stringcontrolled pulleys, to a more sophisticated version sporting foam-padded panels and an air-valve lever enabling fine-grained manipulations of pressure. As the sophistication of her technology increased,
Temple was able to achieve more significant results. Regular sessions in the squeeze machine throughout the day enabled Temple to better regulate her emotions and reduce her anxiety. They also In sum, this brief discussion indicates some of the ways that transformative relations between embodiment and technology have been explored in film and television. Apart from their aesthetic value, these on-screen portrayals of posthuman embodiment remind us that to be an embodied subject is to
